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Abstract
Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical
model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversing an edge
depends on the load; namely, number of players that traverse it. Thus, it abstracts the fact that different
users may use a resource at different times and for different durations, which plays an important role in
determining the costs of the users in reality. For example, when transmitting packets in a communication
network, routing traffic in a road network, or processing a task in a production system, actual sharing and
congestion of resources crucially depends on time.
In [14], we introduced timed network games, which add a time component to network games. Each
vertex v in the network is associated with a cost function, mapping the load on v to the price that a player
pays for staying in v for one time unit with this load. Each edge in the network is guarded by the time
intervals in which it can be traversed, which forces the players to spend time in the vertices. In this work
we significantly extend the way time can be referred to in timed network games. In the model we study,
the network is equipped with clocks, and, as in timed automata, edges are guarded by constraints on the
values of the clocks, and their traversal may involve a reset of some clocks. We argue that the stronger
model captures many realistic networks. The addition of clocks breaks the techniques we developed in
[14] and we develop new techniques in order to show that positive results on classic network games carry
over to the stronger timed setting.
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1 Introduction
Network games (NGs, for short) [11, 48, 49] constitute a well studied model of non-cooperative
games. The game is played among selfish players on a network, which is a directed graph. Each
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player has a source and a target vertex, and a strategy is a choice of a path that connects these two
vertices. The cost a player pays for an edge depends on the load on it, namely the number of players
that use the edge, and the total cost is the sum of costs of the edges she uses. In cost-sharing games,
load has a positive effect on cost: each edge has a cost and the players that use it split the cost among
them. Then, in congestion games4, load has a negative effect on cost: each edge has a non-decreasing
latency function that maps the load on the edge to its cost.
One limitation of NGs is that the cost of using a resource abstracts the fact that different users
may use the resource at different times and for different durations. This is a real limitation, as
time plays an important role in many real-life settings. For example, in a road or a communication
system, congestion only affects cars or messages that use a road or a channel simultaneously. We
are interested in settings in which congestion affects the quality of service (QoS) or the way a price
is shared by entities using a resource at the same time (rather than affecting the travel time). For
example, discomfort increases in a crowded train (in congestion games) or price is shared by the
passengers in a taxi (in cost-sharing games).
The need to address temporal behaviors has attracted a lot of research in theoretical computer
science. Formalisms like temporal logic [46] enable the specification of the temporal ordering of
events. Its refinement to formalisms like real-time temporal logic [8], interval temporal logic [42],
and timed automata (TAs, for short) [7] enables the specification of real-time behaviors. Extensions
of TAs include priced timed automata (PTAs, for short) that assign costs to real-time behaviors.
Thus, PTAs are suitable for reasoning about quality of real-time systems. They lack, however, the
capability to reason about multi-agent systems in which the players’ choices affect the incurred
costs.
We study timed network games (TNGs, for short) – a new model that adds a time component to
NGs. A TNG is played on a timed-network in which edges are labeled by guards that specify time
restrictions on when the edge can be traversed. Similar to NGs, each player has a source and target
vertex, but a strategy is now a timed path that specifies, in addition to which vertices are traversed,
the amount of time that is spent in each vertex. Players pay for staying in vertices, and the cost of
staying in a vertex v in a time interval I ⊆ IR≥0 is affected by the load in v during I . In [14], we
studied a class of TNGs that offered a first extension of NGs to a timed variant in which the reference
to time is restricted: the guards on the edges refer only to global time, i.e., the time that has elapsed
since the beginning of the game. In the model in [14], it is impossible to refer to the duration of
certain events that occur during the game, for example, it is not possible to express constraints that
require staying exactly one time unit in a vertex. Accordingly, we refer to that class as global TNGs
(GTNGs, for short).
In this work, we significantly extend the way time can be referred to in TNGs. We do this by
adding clocks that may be reset along the edges, and by allowing the guards on the edges to refer to
the values of all clocks. GTNGs can be viewed as a fragment in which there is only a single clock
that is never reset. We demonstrate our model in the following example.
I Example 1. Consider a setting in which messages are sent through a network of routers. Mes-
sages are owned by selfish agents who try to avoid congested routes, where there is a greater chance
of loss or corruption. The owners of the messages decide how much time they spend in each router.
Using TNGs, we can model constraints on these times, as well as constraints on global events, in
particular, arrival time. Note that in some applications, c.f., advertising or security, messages need
to patrol the network with a lower bound on their arrival time.
4 The name congestion games is sometimes used to refer to games with general latency functions. We find it more
appropriate to use it to refer to games with non-decreasing functions.
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Consider the TNG appearing in Figure 1. The vertices in the TNG model the routers. There are
two players that model two agents, each sending a message. The source of both messages is s and
the targets are u1 and u2, for messages 1 and 2, respectively. The latency functions are described
in the vertices, as a function of the load m; e.g., the latency function in v2 is `v2(m) = 3m. Thus,
when a single message stays in v2 the cost for each time unit is 3, and when the two messages visit
v2 simultaneously, the cost for each of them is 6 per unit time. The network has two clocks, x and
y. Clock x is reset in each transition and thus is used to impose restrictions on the time that can be
spent in each router: since all transitions can be taken when 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, a message stays between
1 and 2 time units in a router. Clock y is never reset, thus it keeps track of the global time. The
guards on clock y guarantee that message 1 reaches its destination by time 4 but not before time 3
and message 2 reaches its destination by time 5 but not before time 4.
Suppose the first agent chooses the timed path (s, 2), (v1, 1), u1, thus message 1 stays in s for
two time units and in v1 for one time unit before reaching its destination u1. Suppose the second
agent chooses the path (s, 2), (v1, 2), (v2, 1), u2. Note that crossing an edge is instantaneous. Since
both messages stay in the same vertices during the intervals I1 = [0, 2] and I2 = [2, 3], the load in
the corresponding vertices is 2. During interval I1, each of the agents pays |I1| · `s(2) = 2 · 4 and
during I2, each pays |I2| · `v1(2) = 1 · 2. Message 2 stays in v1 alone during the interval [3, 4] and
in v2 during the interval [4, 5], for which it pays 1 and 3, respectively. The total costs are thus 10 and
14. J
m 2m 3m
u1 v1 s v2 u2
1 ≤ x ≤ 2∧
3 ≤ y ≤ 4, {x}
1 ≤ x ≤ 2, {x} 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, {x} 1 ≤ x ≤ 2∧
4 ≤ y ≤ 5, {x}
1 ≤ x ≤ 2, {x}
Figure 1 A congestion TNG.
Before we elaborate on our contribution, let us survey relevant works, namely, extensions of
NGs with temporal aspects and extensions of timed-automata to games. Extensions of NGs that
involve reasoning about time mostly study a cost model in which the players try to minimize the
time of arrival at their destinations (c.f., [36, 39, 47, 45]), where, for example, congestion affects
the duration of crossing an edge. These works are different from ours since we consider a QoS
cost model. An exception is [36], which studies the QoS costs. A key difference in the models is
that there, time is discrete and the players have finitely many strategies. Thus, reductions to classical
resource allocation games is straightforward while for TNGs it is not possible, as we elaborate below.
Games on timed automata were first studied in [12] in which an algorithm to solve timed games with
timed reachability objective was given. The work was later generalized and improved [5, 20, 35, 23].
Average timed games, games with parity objectives, mean-payoff games and energy games have also
been studied in the context of timed automata [3, 37, 27, 21, 34]. All the timed games above are two-
player zero-sum ongoing games. Prices are fixed and there is no notion of load. Also, the questions
studied on these games concern their decidability, namely finding winners and strategies for them.
TNGs are not zero-sum games, so winning strategies do not exist. Instead, the problems we study
here concern rationality and stability.
The first question that arises in the context of non-zero-sum games is the existence of stable
outcomes. In the context of NGs, the most prominent stability concept is that of a (pure) Nash
equilibrium (NE, for short) [43] – a profile such that no player can decrease her cost by unilaterally
deviating from her current strategy.5 Decentralized decision-making may lead to solutions that are
5 Throughout this paper, we consider pure strategies, as is the case for the vast literature on NGs.
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sub-optimal for the society as a whole. The standard measures to quantify the inefficiency incurred
due to selfish behavior is the price of stability (PoS) [11] and the price of anarchy (PoA) [38]. In both
measures we compare against the social optimum (SO, for short), namely a profile that minimizes
the sum of costs of all players. The PoS (PoA, respectively) is the best-case (worst-case) inefficiency
of an NE; that is, the ratio between the cost of a best (worst) NE and the SO.
The picture of stability and equilibrium inefficiency for standard NGs is well understood. Every
NG has an NE, and in fact these games are potential games [48], which have the following stronger
property: a best response sequence is a sequence of profiles P1, P2, . . . such that, for i ≥ 1, the
profile Pi+1 is obtained from Pi by letting some player deviate and decrease her personal cost. In
finite potential games, every best-response sequence converges to an NE. For k-player cost-sharing
NGs, the PoS and PoA are log k and k, respectively [11]. For congestion games with affine cost
functions, PoS ≈ 1.577 [29, 2] and PoA = 52 [30].
In [14], we showed that these positive results carry over to GTNGs. A key technical feature of
GTNGs is that since guards refer to global time, it is easy to find an upper bound T on the time by
which all players reach their destinations. Proving existence of NE follows from a reduction to NGs,
using a zone-like structure [6, 18]. The introduction of clocks with resets breaks the direct reduction
to NGs and questions the existence of a bound by which the players arrive at their destinations. Even
with an upper bound on time, a reduction from TNGs to NGs is not likely. Consider the following
example. From s1, the earliest absolute time at which vertex v2 is reached is 2 following the path
〈(s1, 0)(v1, 0), (v1, 2), (v2, 2)〉, and the value of clock x at v2 is 0. On the other hand, when v2
is reached from s2 following the path 〈(s2, 0)(v2, 0), (v2, 2)〉, then at absolute time 2, the value
of clock x at v2 is 2 and the transition to vertex u is thus enabled. This leads to a spurious path
〈(s1, 0)(v1, 0), (v1, 2), (v2, 2), (u, 2)〉 which does not correspond to a valid path in th TNG.
v1 v2 us1
s2
{x} 2≤ x≤ 4, {x}
{x}
2≤ x≤ 5
(v1, 0) (v1, 2)(s1, 0) (v1, 4)
(s2, 0) (v2, 0) (v2, 2) (v2, 4)
(u, 2) (u, 4)
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 2 An attempt to translate a TNG to an NG.
Further, to see the difficulty in finding such a bound, consider, for example, a cost-sharing game
in which all players, on their paths to their targets, need to stay for one time unit in a “gateway”
vertex v that costs 1 (see details in Section 6). Assume also that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Player i can only
reach v in times that are multiples of pi, for relatively prime numbers p1, . . . , pk. The SO is obtained
when all players synchronize their visits to v, and such a synchronization forces them to wait till time
p1 · . . . · pk, which is exponential in the TNG.
The lack of an upper bound on the global time in TNGs demonstrates that we need a different
approach to obtain positive results for general TNGs. We show that TNGs are guaranteed to have
an NE. Our proof uses a combination of techniques from real-time models and resource allocation
games. Recall that a PTA assigns a price to a timed word. We are able to reduce the best-response
and the social-optimum problems to and from the problem of finding cheapest runs in PTAs [19],
showing that the problems are PSPACE-complete. Next, we show that TNGs are potential games.
Note that since players have uncountably many strategies, the fact that TNGs are potential games
does not immediately imply existence of an NE, as a best-response sequence may not be finite.
We show that there is a best-response sequence that terminates in an NE. For this, we first need
to show the existence of an integral best-response, which is obtained from the reduction to PTAs.
Finally, given a TNG, we find a time T such that there exists an NE in which all players reach their
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destination by time T .
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Resource allocation games and network games
For k ∈ N, let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. A resource allocation game (RAG, for short) isR = 〈k,E, {Σi}i∈[k],
{`e}e∈E〉, where k ∈ N is the number of players; E is a set of resources; for i ∈ [k], the set strategies
of Player i is Σi ⊆ 2E ; and, for e ∈ E, the latency function `e : [k] → Q≥0 maps a load on e to its
cost under this load. A profile is a choice of a strategy for each player. The set of profiles of R is
profiles(R) = Σ1 × . . . × Σk. For e ∈ E, we define the load on e in a profile P = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉,
denoted loadP (e), as the number of players using e in P , thus loadP (e) = |{i ∈ [k] : e ∈ σi}|. The
cost a player pays in profile P , denoted costi(P ), depends on the choices of the other players. We
define costi(P ) =
∑
e∈σi `e(loadP (e)).
Network games (NGs, for short) can be viewed as a special case of RAGs where strategies are
succinctly represented by means of paths in graphs. An NG isN = 〈k, V ,E, {〈si, ui〉}i∈[k], {`e}e∈E〉,
where 〈V,E〉 is a directed graph; for i ∈ [k], the vertices si and ui are the source and target vertices
of Player i; and the latency functions are as in RAGs. The set of strategies for Player i is the set of
simple paths from si to ui in N . Thus, in NGs, the resources are the edges in the graph.
We distinguish between two types of latency functions. In cost-sharing games, the players that
visit a vertex share its cost equally. Formally, every e ∈ E has a cost ce ∈ Q≥0 and its latency
function is `e(l) = cel . Note that these latency functions are decreasing, thus the load has a positive
effect on the cost. In contrast, in congestion games, the cost functions are non-decreasing and so
the load has a negative effect on the cost. Typically, the latency functions are restricted to simple
functions such as linear latency functions, polynomials, and so forth.
2.2 Timed networks and timed network games
A clock is a variable that gets values from IR≥0 and whose value increases as time elapses. A reset
of a clock x assigns value 0 to x. A guard over a set C of clocks is a conjunction of clock constraints
of the form x ∼ m, for x ∈ C, ∼∈ {≤,=,≥}, and m ∈ N. Note that we disallow guards that
use the operators < and > (see Remark 4). A guard of the form
∧
x∈C x ≥ 0 is called true. The
set of guards over C is denoted Φ(C). A clock valuation is an assignment κ : C → IR≥0. A clock
valuation κ satisfies a guard g, denoted κ |= g, if the expression obtained from g by replacing each
clock x ∈ C with the value κ(x) is valid.
A timed network is a tuple A = 〈C, V,E〉, where C is a set of clocks, V is a set of vertices, and
E ⊆ V ×Φ(C)× 2C × V is a set of directed edges in which each edge e is associated with a guard
g ∈ Φ(C) that should be satisfied when e is traversed and a set R ⊆ C of clocks that are reset along
the traversal of e.
When traversing a path in a timed network, time is spent in vertices, and edges are traversed
instantaneously. Accordingly, a timed path in A is a sequence η = 〈τ1, e1〉, . . . , 〈τn, en〉 ∈ (IR≥0 ×
E)∗, describing edges that the path traverses along with their traversal times. The timed path η is
legal if the edges are successive and the guards associated with them are satisfied. Formally, there is a
sequence 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn−1, tn−1〉, vn ∈ (V×IR≥0)∗·V , describing the vertices that η visits and the
time spent in these vertices, such that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the following hold: (1) tj−1 = τj−τj−1,
with τ0 = 0, (2) there is gj ∈ Φ(C) and Rj ⊆ C, such that ej = 〈vj−1, gj , Rj , vj〉, (3) there is a
clock valuation κj that describes the values of the clocks before the incoming edge to vertex vj is
traversed. Thus, κ1(x) = t0, for all x ∈ C, and for 1 < j ≤ n, we distinguish between clocks that
are reset when ej−1 is traversed and clocks that are not reset: for x ∈ Rj−1, we define κj(x) = tj−1,
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and for x ∈ (C \Rj−1), we define κj(x) = κj−1(x) + tj−1, and (4) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have
that κj |= gj . We sometimes refer to η also as the sequence 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn−1, tn−1〉, vn.
Consider a finite set T ⊆ IR≥0 of time points. We say that a timed path η is a T -path if all edges
in η are taken at times in T . Formally, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have that τj ∈ T . We refer to the
time at which η ends as the time τn at which the destination is reached. We say that η is integral if
T ⊆ N.
A timed network game (TNG, for short) extends an NG by imposing constraints on the times at
which edges may be traversed. Formally, T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉 includes a set C
of clocks, and 〈C, V,E〉 is a timed network. Recall that while traversing a path in a timed network,
time is spent in vertices. Accordingly, the latency functions now apply to vertices, thus `v : [k] →
Q≥0 maps a load on vertex v to its cost under this load. Traversing an edge is instantaneous and
is free of charge. A strategy for Player i, for i ∈ [k], is then a legal timed path from si to ui. We
assume all players have at least one strategy.
I Remark. A possible extension of TNGs is to allow costs on edges. Since edges are traversed
instantaneously, these costs would not be affected by load. Such an extension does not affect our
results and we leave it out for sake of simplicity. Another possible extension is allowing strict time
guards, which we discuss in Remark 4.
The cost Player i pays in profile P , denoted costi(P ), depends on the vertices in her timed
path, the time spent on them, and the load during the visits. In order to define the cost formally,
we need some definitions. For a finite set T ⊆ IR≥0 of time points, we say that a timed path is a
T -strategy if it is a T -path. Then, a profile P is a T -profile if it consists only of T -strategies. Let
tmax = max(T ). For t ∈ T such that t < tmax, let nextT (t) be the minimal time point in T that is
strictly larger than t. We partition the interval [0, tmax] into a set Υ of sub-intervals [m,nextT (m)]
for every m ∈ (T ∪ {0}) \ {tmax}. We refer to the sub-intervals in Υ as periods. Suppose T is the
minimal set such that P is a T -profile. Note that Υ is the coarsest partition of [0, tmax] into periods
such that no player crosses an edge within a period in Υ. We denote this partition by ΥP .
For a player i ∈ [k] and a period γ ∈ ΥP , let visitsP (i, γ) be the vertex that Player i visits during
period γ. That is, if pii = 〈vi0, ti0〉, . . . , 〈vini−1, tini−1〉, vini is a legal timed path that is a strategy for
Player i and γ = [m1,m2], then visitsP (i, γ) is the vertex vij for the index 1 ≤ j < ni such that
τ ij ≤ m1 ≤ m2 ≤ τ ij+1, and visitsP (i, γ) is the vertex vi0 if 0 = m1 ≤ m2 ≤ τ i1. Note that since
P is a T -profile, for each period γ ∈ ΥP , the number of players that stay in each vertex v during
γ is fixed. Let loadP (v, γ) denote this number. Formally loadP (v, γ) = |{i : visitsP (i, γ) = v}|.
Finally, for a period γ = [m1,m2], let |γ| = m2−m1 be the duration of γ. Suppose Player i’s path
ends at time τ i. Let ΥiP ⊆ ΥP denote the periods that end by time τi.
Recall that the latency function `v : [k] −→ Q≥0 maps the number of players that simultaneously
visit vertex v to the price that each of them pays per time unit. If visitsP (i, γ) = v, then the cost
of Player i in P , over the period γ is costγ,i(P ) = `v(loadP (v, γ)) · |γ|. We define costi(P ) =∑
γ∈Υi
P
costγ,i(P ). The cost of the profile P , denoted cost(P ), is the total cost incurred by all the
players, i.e., cost(P ) =
∑k
i=1 costi(P ).
A T -strategy is called an integral strategy when T ⊆ N, and similarly for integral profile.
A profile P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉 is said to end by time τ if for each i ∈ [k], the strategy pii ends by
time τ . Consider a TNG T that has a cycle such that a clock x of T is reset on the cycle. It is not
difficult to see that this may lead to T having infinitely many integral profiles that end by different
times. A TNG T is called global if it has a single clock x that is never reset. We use GTNG to
indicate that a TNG is global.
As in RAGs, we distinguish between cost-sharing TNGs that have cost-sharing latency functions
and congestion TNGs in which the latency functions are non-decreasing.
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2.3 Stability and efficiency
Consider a gameG. For a profile P and a strategy pi of player i ∈ [k], let P [i← pi] denote the profile
obtained from P by replacing the strategy of Player i in P by pi. A profile P is said to be a (pure)
Nash equilibrium (NE) if none of the players in [k] can benefit from a unilateral deviation from her
strategy in P to another strategy. Formally, for every Player i and every strategy pi for Player i, it
holds that costi(P [i← pi]) ≥ costi(P ).
A social optimum (SO) of a game G is a profile that attains the infimum cost over all profiles.
We denote by SO(G) the cost of an SO profile; i.e., SO(G) = infP∈profiles(G) cost(P ). It is well
known that decentralized decision-making may lead to sub-optimal solutions from the point of view
of the society as a whole. We quantify the inefficiency incurred due to self-interested behavior by
the price of anarchy (PoA) [38, 44] and price of stability (PoS) [11] measures. The PoA is the
worst-case inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, while the PoS measures the best-case inefficiency
of a Nash equilibrium. Note that unlike resource allocation games in which the set of profiles is
finite, in TNGs there can be uncountably many NEs, so both PoS and PoA need to be defined using
infimum/supremum rather than min/max. Formally,
I Definition 2. Let G be a family of games, and let G ∈ G be a game in G. Let Γ(G) be the set of
Nash equilibria of the game G. Assume that Γ(G) 6= ∅.
The price of anarchy of G is PoA(G) = supP∈Γ(G) cost(P )/SO(G). The price of anarchy of
the family of games G is PoA(G) = supG∈GPoA(G).
The price of stability of G is PoS(G) = infP∈Γ(G) cost(P )/SO(G). The price of stability of
the family of games G is PoS(G) = supG∈GPoS(G).
3 The Best-Response and the Social-Optimum Problems
Consider a TNG T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉. In the best-response problem (BR prob-
lem, for short), we ask how a player reacts to a choice of strategies of the other players. Formally, let
pi1, . . . , pik−1 be a choice of integral6 strategies for Players 1, . . . , k− 1 in T . We look for a strategy
pik that minimizes costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik〉). The choice of allowing Player k to react is arbitrary and is
done for convenience of notation. In the social optimum problem (SOPT problem, for short), we
seek a profile that maximizes the social welfare, or in other words, minimizes the sum of players’
costs.
In this section we describe priced timed automata (PTAs, for short) [10, 17] and show that while
they are different from TNGs both in terms of the model and the questions asked on it, they offer a
useful framework for reasoning about TNGs. In particular, we solve the BR and SOPT problems by
reductions to problems about PTAs.
3.1 From TNGs to priced timed automata
A PTA [10, 17] is P = 〈C, V,E, {rv}v∈V 〉, where 〈C, V,E〉 is a timed network and rv ∈ Q≥0 is
the rate of vertex v ∈ V . Intuitively, the rate rv specifies the cost of staying in v for a duration of
one time unit. Thus, a timed path η = 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn, tn〉, vn+1 in a PTA has a price, denoted
price(η), which is
∑
0≤j≤n rv · tv . The size of P is |V |+ |E| plus the number of bits needed in the
binary encoding of the numbers appearing in guards and rates in P . 7
6 We choose integral strategies since strategies with irrational times cannot be represented as part of the input; for
strategies that use rational times, the best response problem can be solved with little modification in the proof of
Theorem 4.
7 In general, PTAs have rates on transitions and strict time guards, which we do not need here.
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Consider a PTAP and two vertices s and u. Let paths(s, u) be the set of timed paths from s to u.
We are interested in cheapest timed paths in paths(s, u). A priori, there is no reason to assume that
the minimal price is attained, thus we are interested in the optimal price, denoted opt(s, u), which
we define to be inf{price(η) : η ∈ paths(s, u)}. The corresponding decision problem, called the
cost optimal reachability problem (COR, for short) takes in addition a threshold µ, and the goal is to
decide whether opt(s, t) ≤ µ. Recall that we do not allow the guards to use the operators < and >.
I Theorem 3. [19, 32] The COR problem is PSPACE-complete for PTAs with two or more
clocks. Moreover, the optimal price is attained by an integral path, i.e., there is an integral path
η ∈ paths(s, u) with price(η) = opt(s, u).
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below, we reduce problems on TNGs to problems on PTAs. The reduc-
tions allow us to obtain properties on strategies and profiles in TNGs using results on PTAs, which
we later use in combination with techniques for NGs in order to solve problems on TNGs.
3.2 The best-response problem
I Theorem 4. Consider a TNG T with n clocks and integral strategies pi1, . . . , pik−1 for Play-
ers 1, . . . , k−1. There is a PTA P with n+1 clocks and two vertices v and u such that there is a one-
to-one cost-preserving correspondence between strategies for Player k in T and timed paths from v
to u: for every strategy pik in T and its corresponding path η in P , we have costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik〉) =
price(η).
Proof. Consider a TNG T = 〈k, V,E,C, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉, where C = {x1, . . . , xm}. Let
Q = 〈pi1, . . . , pik−1〉 be a choice of timed paths for Players 1, . . . , k − 1. Note that Q can be seen
as a profile in a game that is obtained from T by removing Player k, and we use the definitions for
profiles on Q in the expected manner. Let T ⊆ Q be the minimal set of time points for which all
the strategies in Q are T -strategies. Consider two consecutive time points a, b ∈ T , i.e., there is no
c ∈ T with a < c < b. Then, there are players that cross edges at times a and b, and no player
crosses an edge at time points in the interval (a, b). Moreover, let tmax be the latest time in T , then
tmax is the latest time at which a player reaches her destination. Let ΥQ be a partition of [0, tmax]
according to T . We obtain Υ′Q from ΥQ by adding the interval [tmax,∞).
A key observation is that the load on all the vertices is unchanged during every interval in Υ′Q.
For a vertex v ∈ V and δ ∈ ΥQ, the cost Player k pays per unit time for using v in the interval δ is
`v(loadQ(v, δ) + 1). On the other hand, since all k− 1 players reach their destination by time tmax,
the load on v after tmax is 0, and the cost Player k pays for using it then is `v(1).
The PTA P that we construct has |Υ′Q| copies of T , thus its vertices are V × Υ′Q. Let δ0 =
[0, b] ∈ Υ′Q be the first interval. We consider paths from the vertex v = 〈sk, δ0〉, which is the copy
of Player k’s source in the first copy of T , to a target u, which is a new vertex we add and whose only
incoming edges are from vertices of the form 〈uk, δ〉, namely, the copies of the target vertex uk of
Player k. We construct P such that each such path η from v to u in P corresponds to a legal strategy
pik for Player k in T , and such that costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik−1, pik〉) = price(η). The main difference
between the copies are the vertices’ costs, which depend on the load as in the above. We refer to the
n clocks in T as local clocks. In each copy of P , we use the local clocks and their guards in T as
well as an additional global clock that is never reset to keep track of global time. Let δ = [a, b] ∈ ΥQ
and δ′ = [b, c] ∈ Υ′Q be the following interval. Let Tδ and Tδ′ be the copies of T that corresponds to
the respective intervals. The local clocks guarantee that a path in Tδ is a legal path in T . The global
clock allows us to make sure that (1) proceeding from Tδ to Tδ′ can only occur precisely at time b,
and (2) proceeding from 〈uk, δ〉 in Tδ to the target u can only occur at a time in the interval δ.
We now formalize the intuition of the reduction given above. We define P = 〈V ′, E′, C ∪
{xn+1}, {rv}v∈V ′〉, where V ′ = (V × Υ′Q) ∪ {u}, and E′ = E′l ∪ E′i ∪ E′t, where E′l is a set of
G. Avni, S. Guha and O. Kupferman XX:9
external edges, E′i is a set of internal edges and E
′
t is a set of target edges. Let δ1, . . . , δ|Υ′Q| be
the set of intervals arranged according to increasing inf(δj), i.e., for all j ∈ [|Υ′Q| − 1], we have
that inf(δj) < inf(δj+1). Also for every interval δ = δj , we represent by next(δ), the interval
δj+1, and let τδj = sup(δj). For each v ∈ V , and δ ∈ ΥQ, there is an external edge of the
form 〈〈v, δ〉, {xn+1 = τδ}, ∅, 〈v, next(δ)〉〉, where τδ = sup(δ). Hence an external edge moves
from copy δ to its next copy at global time τδ . The internal edges in a copy match the ones in
T . Thus, for every δ ∈ ΥQ, we have an edge e′ = 〈〈v, δ〉, g, R, 〈v′, δ〉〉 in E′ iff there is an edge
e = 〈v, g, R, v′〉 ∈ E. Also the guard and the clock reset on e′ are exactly the same as that of e. Note
that clock xn+1 is not used in the internal edges. For each copy corresponding to δ ∈ ΥQ, there is a
target edge from the vertex (uk, δ) to u with the guard xn+1 ≤ τδ , and from the copy corresponding
to the last interval δ|Υ′
Q
|, there is an edge from (uk, δ|Υ′
Q
|) to u with the guard xn+1 ≥ τδ|Υ′
Q
|−1 .
Finally, we define the rate of a vertex 〈v, i〉. Let l be the load on v during time interval δ, then the
rate of 〈v, δ〉 is `v(l + 1). Note that for every vertex 〈v, δ|Υ′
Q
|〉, in the |Υ′Q|-th copy of P , the rate is
`v(1).
We prove that the cost of the best response strategy of Player k in T is the same as the cost of
a cost optimal path in P . We consider a strategy pi of Player k in T and let P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉 and
show that there is a path η in P such that costk(P ) is the same as cost of the path η. Similarly, for a
path η in P , we show that there exists a strategy pi of Player k such that again costk(P ) is the same
as cost of the path η in P .
Consider the strategy pi = (v1, t1), . . . , (vp, tp), uk of Player k in T such that v1 = sk. We
construct a timed path pi′ = 〈〈v1, δ11〉, t1〉, 〈〈v2, δ11〉, t2〉, . . . , 〈〈v`, δ`〉, t`〉, 〈〈v`+1, δ`+1〉, 0〉, u in
P in the following manner. Firstly, v1 = sk, v`+1 = uk and i1 = 1. Consider the mapping
g : IR≥0 7→ Υ′Q such that g(0) = δ1, and for
∑i
j=1 tj ≤ τ1, we have g(
∑i
j=1 tj) = δ1 and
when
∑i
j=1 tj ≥ τ1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `, we have g(
∑i
j=1 tj) = δξ if τξ−1 ≤ g(
∑i−1
j=1 tj) ≤ τξ.
Intuitively, g maps a global time τ to the ξth copy of the TNG T in P if τξ−1 ≤ τ ≤ τξ. Consider
(vi, ti) in the path pi for some i ∈ [p]. Suppose there are times τr, τr+1, . . . , τr+h ∈ T such that
all these h + 1 times belong to the interval [
∑i−1
j=1 tj ,
∑i
j=1 tj ]. Then in pi′, we replace (vi, ti)
by 〈〈vi, g(
∑i−1
j=1 tj)〉, τr −
∑i−1
j=1 tj〉, 〈〈vi, g(τr)〉, τr+1 − τr〉, . . . , 〈〈vi, g(τr+l)〉,
∑i
j=1 tj − τr+l〉.
Again from the definition of fv , for v ∈ V ′, we can see that the cost of the timed path pi′ in P is the
same as costk(P ).
Now we consider the other direction. Consider a path η = 〈〈v1, δ1〉, t1〉, 〈〈v2, δ2〉, t2〉, . . .,
〈〈v`, δ`〉, t`〉, 〈〈v`+1, δ`+1〉, 0〉, u in P such that v1 = sk and v`+1 = uk. We construct a path
pi in T from pi as follows. Every internal edge (〈〈vj , δj〉, tj〉, 〈〈vj+1, δj+1〉, tj+1〉) is replaced by
the edge (〈vj , tj〉, 〈vj+1, tj+1〉) in pi. Note that here ij = ij+1. A sequence of external edges
(〈〈vj , ij〉, tj〉, . . . , 〈〈vj+l, ij+1〉, tj+l〉) such that vj = vj+1 = · · · = vj+l is replaced by (〈vj , tj +
tj+1+· · ·+tj+l〉). Let t0 = 0. The cost along path η inP is rv1(l1)·t1+rv2(l2)·t2+· · ·+rv`(l`)·t`,
where for 1 ≤ j ≤ `, we have lj = loadP (vj , [
∑j
q=1 tq −
∑j−1
q=1 tq]). Let P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik−1, pi〉 is
the profile obtained from the strategies of the k players. From the definition of fv for each v ∈ V ′,
it is not difficult to see that costk(P ) is the same as the cost of the timed path η.
Note that given integral strategies of k− 1 players, an integral path in P translates to an integral
strategy of Player k in T . Since it is known that a cost optimal path in P can be an integral path
[19], the best response of Player k in T is an integral strategy. J
We conclude with the computational complexity of the BR problem. The decision-problem
variant gets as input a TNG T , integral strategies pi1, . . . , pik−1 for Players 1, . . ., k − 1, and a value
µ, and the goal is to decide whether Player k has a strategy pik such that costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik〉) ≤ µ.
Theorem 4 implies a reduction from the BR problem to the COR problem and a reduction in the other
direction is easy since PTAs can be seen as TNGs with a single player. For one-clock instances, we
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show that the BR problem is NP-hard by a reduction from the subset-sum problem. Note the contrast
with the COR problem in one-clock instances, which is NLOGSPACE-complete [41].
I Theorem 5. The BR problem is PSPACE-complete for TNGs with two or more clocks. For
one-clock cost-sharing and congestion TNGs it is in PSPACE and NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the BR problem to and from the COR problem, which is PSPACE-complete for
PTAs with at least two clocks [19]. A PTA can be seen as a one-player TNG, thus the BR problem
for TNGs with two or more clocks is PSPACE-hard. For the upper bound, given a TNG T , strategies
Q = 〈pi1, . . . , pik−1〉 for Players 1, . . . , k − 1, and a threshold µ, we construct a PTA P as in the
proof of Theorem 4. Note that the size of P is polynomial in the size of the input and that P has
one more clock than T . An optimal path in P is a best response for Player k, and such a path can be
found in PSPACE.
The final case to consider is TNGs with one clock. We show that the BR problem is NP-hard for
such instances using a reduction from the subset-sum problem. The input to that problem is a set of
natural numbers A = {a1, . . . , an} and µ ∈ N, and the goal is to decide whether there is a subset of
A whose sum is µ. We start with the cost-sharing case. The game we construct is a two-player game
on a network that is depicted in Figure 3. Player 2 has a unique strategy that visits vertex vn+1 in the
time interval [µ, µ + 1]. A Player 1 strategy pi corresponds to a choice of a subset of A. Player 1’s
source is v1 and her target is u2. The vertex vn+1 is the only vertex that has a cost, which is 1, and
the other vertices cost 0. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Player 1 needs to choose between staying in vertex vi for
a duration of ai time units, and exiting the vertex through the top edge, or staying 0 time units, and
exiting the vertex through the bottom edge. Finally, she must stay in vn+1 for exactly one time unit.
The cost Player 1 pays for vn+1 depends on the load. If she stays there in the global time interval
[µ, µ + 1], she pays 1/2, and otherwise she pays 1. Thus, Player 1 has a strategy with which she
pays 1/2 iff there is a subset of A whose sum is µ, and we are done.
v1 v2 v3
· · · 1
v
n+1
u1
s2
u2
x = µ, ∅
x = µ+ 1, ∅
x = a1, {x}
x = 0, {x}
x = a2, {x}
x = 0, {x}
x = a3, {x}
x = 0, {x}
x = a
n
, {x}
x = 0, {x}
x = 1, {x}
Figure 3 NP-hardness proof of best response problem in one clock TNG
The reduction for congestion games is similar. Recall that in congestion games, the cost increases
with the load, thus a player would aim at using a vertex together with as few other players as possible.
The network is the same as the one used above. Instead of two players, we use three players, where
Players 2 and 3 have a unique strategy each. Player 2 must stay in vn+1 in the time interval [0, µ]
and Player 3 must stay there during the interval [µ+ 1,
∑
1≤i≤n ai]. As in the above, Player 1 has a
strategy in which she uses vn+1 alone in the time interval [µ, µ+ 1] iff there is a subset of A whose
sum is µ. J
3.3 The social-optimum problem
I Theorem 6. Consider a TNG T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉. There is a PTA P with
k · |C| clocks, |V |k vertices, and two vertices s¯ and u¯ such that there is a one-to-one cost-preserving
correspondence between profiles in T and paths from s¯ to u¯; namely, for a profile P and its corres-
ponding path ηP , we have cost(P ) = price(ηP ).
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Proof. First, we show how to construct, given a TNG T with self loops, a TNG T ′ that has no
self loops. Consider a vertex v that has a self loop e = 〈v, g, R, v〉 in T . In T ′, we remove e,
we add a vertex v′, a new clock x and “redirect” e to v′ while resetting x. Formally, we have the
edge 〈v, g, R∪ {x}, v′〉. We enforce that v′ is left instantaneously using an edge 〈v′, {x = 0}, ∅, v〉.
Clearly, the strategies of the players in T and T ′ coincide.
Recall that the social optimum is obtained when the players do not act selfishly, rather they co-
operate to find the profile that minimizes their sum of costs. Let T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉.
We construct a PTA P by taking k copies of T . For i ∈ [k], the i-th copy is used to keep track of the
timed path that Player i uses. We need k copies of the clocks of T to guarantee that the individual
paths are legal. Recall that the players’ goal is to minimize their total cost, thus for each point in
time, the price they pay in P is the sum of their individual costs in T . More formally, consider a
vertex v¯ = 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 in P and let Sv¯ ⊆ V be the set of vertices that appear in v¯. Then, the load
on a vertex v ∈ Sv¯ in v¯ is loadv¯(v) = |{i : vi = v}|, and the rate of v¯ is
∑
v∈Sv¯ `v(loadv¯(v)). We
show below that the cost of the social optimum in T coincides with the price of the optimal timed
path in P from 〈s1, . . . , sk〉 to the vertex 〈u1, . . . , uk〉, i.e., the vertices that respectively correspond
to the sources and targets of all players. Towards this, we show that for every path η in the PTA
P , there exists a profile Pη in T such that price(η) in P equals cost(Pη) in T . Consider a timed
path η = (v¯1, t1), . . . , (v¯n, tn), u¯ in P where s¯ = v¯1 and v¯j = 〈v1j , . . . , vkj 〉, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. For
each Player i ∈ [k], we construct a timed path pii in T as follows. Intuitively, we restrict η to the
i-th component and remove recurring vertices. Consider an index 1 ≤ j ≤ n in which Player i
changes vertices in η, thus vij 6= vij+1. We call such an index j a changing index. Let j1, . . . , jm
be the changing indices for Player i. Let j0 = 1 and jm+1 = n. Note that between changing in-
dices Player i does not change vertices. We define pii = 〈vij0 , ti0〉, 〈vij1 , ti1〉, . . . , 〈vijm , tim〉, where for
p ∈ {0} ∪ [m], we have tip =
∑
jp≤l<jp+1 tl. That is, t
i
p is the total time that Player i spends in v
i
jp
in η.
We claim that pii is a legal path, i.e., we claim that the respective guards are satisfied when the
path switches between vertices by crossing the edges. Consider an index 1 ≤ l ≤ m. We can
prove by induction on the length of pii that for every clock x ∈ C, the value of x after the prefix
〈vij1 , ti1〉, . . . , 〈vijl , til〉 of pii equals the value of the clock 〈x, i〉 after the prefix 〈v¯1, t1〉, . . . , 〈v¯jl , tjl〉
of η. We note that from the way we construct the set R of clocks that are reset along an edge of
the PTA P , clock 〈x, i〉 can only be reset exactly at the times at which x is reset in pii. Finally, let
Pη = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉. It is not hard to see that cost(Pη) = price(η).
Showing correctness of the other direction of the reduction is dual; namely, given a profile P =
〈pi1, . . . , pik〉 in T we construct a path η from s¯ to u¯ in P such that cost(P ) = price(η). J
We turn to study the complexity of the SOPT problem. In the decision-problem variant, we
are given a TNG T and a value µ and the goal is to decide whether there is a profile P in T with
cost(P ) ≤ µ. Theorem 6 implies a reduction from the SOPT problem to the COR problem, and,
as in the BR problem, the other direction is trivial. For one-clock instances, we use the same NP-
hardness proof as in the BR problem.
I Theorem 7. The SOPT problem is PSPACE-complete for at least two clocks and it is NP-hard
for TNGs with one clock.
Proof. In [19], the COR problem was shown to be in PSPACE as follows. Given a PTA P =
〈C, V,E, {rv}v∈V 〉, they construct a weighted discrete graph, which is an extension of the region
graph [7]. Let RP denote the region graph of P . Then, the size of the weighted directed graph of
P is at most (|C| + 1) · |RP |. The size of the region graph is O(χ|C| · |C|! · |V |), where χ is the
maximum constant appearing in the guards on the edges of P . Note that the size of this weighted
discrete graph is exponential in the size of P and the length of a cost optimal path is bounded by
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the number of vertices in the weighted discrete graph. Further the encoding of the cost of a cost
optimal path can be done in PSPACE. Hence one can decide in NPSPACE, thus in PSPACE, the
COR problem.
Given a TNG T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉, let P be the PTA constructed in the proof
of Theorem 6. Recall that P has k|C| clocks and |V |k vertices and an SO in T corresponds to an
optimal path η in P and the cost of the SO profile equals the cost of the path η. We note that the size
of the weighted discrete graph for P is exponential in the size of the input T . Since the cost of an
SO in T equals the cost of a cost optimal path in P , the PSPACE-membership of the SOPT problem
follows.
It remains to prove that the SOPT problem is PSPACE-hard. In [1], the reachability problem for
timed automata (which we call here timed networks) with only equality operators on the guards, has
been shown to be PSPACE-complete. Given a timed networkA = 〈C, V,E〉, an initial and final ver-
tex s and u in V respectively, we construct a one player TNG T = 〈1, C, V ′, E′, {`v}v∈V , 〈s1, u1〉〉,
where V ′ = V ∪{s′, u′, v} such that s′, u′ and v′ are not in V . The setE′ = E∪{(s′, s), (u, u′), (s′, v), (v, u′)}.
All the vertices apart from v are free vertices while `v(1) = 1 such that the only player has a strategy
that costs less than or equal to 0 iff there is a path from s to u in A. Note that in a one-player game,
the social optimum is the strategy (which is a timed path) that minimizes the cost of the player. The
vertices s′ and u′ are the fresh initial and target vertices respectively and connect s′ to s and u′ to u.
Thus, if there is a path from s to u in A, then Player 1 has a strategy with cost 0. Otherwise, if there
is no path from s to u in A, then the cost of the strategy that uses v is 1.
For the lower bound of one-clock instances, we revisit the NP-hardness proof of the BR-problem
in Theorem 5. For a cost-sharing TNG, we note that an SO with cost no more than 1 exists iff there
is a solution to the subset-sum problem. The proof for congestion TNG is analogous. J
4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
The first question that arises in the context of games is the existence of an NE. In [14], we showed
that GTNGs are guaranteed to have an NE by reducing every GTNG to an NG. We strengthen the
result by showing that every TNG has an NE.
In order to prove existence, we combine techniques from NGs and use the reduction to PTA
in Theorem 4. A standard method for finding an NE is showing that a best-response sequence
converges: Starting from some profile P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉, one searches for a player that can benefit
from a unilateral deviation. If no such player exists, then P is an NE and we are done. Otherwise, let
pi′i be a beneficial deviation for Player i, i.e., costi(P ) > costi(P [i ← pi′i]). The profile P [i ← pi′i]
is considered next and the above procedure repeats.
A potential function for a game is a function Ψ that maps profiles to costs, such that the following
holds: for every profile P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉, i ∈ [k], and strategy pi′i for Player i, we have Ψ(P ) −
Ψ(P [i← pi′i]) = costi(P )−costi(P [i← pi′i]), i.e., the change in potential equals the change in cost
of the deviating player. A game is a potential game if it has a potential function. In a potential game
with finitely many profiles, since the potential of every profile is non-negative and in every step of a
best-response sequence the potential strictly decreases, every best-response sequence terminates in
an NE. It is well-known that RAGs are potential games [48] and since they are finite, this implies
that an NE always exists.
The idea of our proof is as follows. First, we show that TNGs are potential games, which does
not imply existence of NE since TNGs have infinitely many profiles. Then, we focus on a specific
best-response sequence that starts from an integral profile and allows the players to deviate only to
integral strategies. Finally, we define normalized TNGs and show how to normalize a TNG in a way
that preserves existence of NE. For normalized TNGs, we show that the potential reduces at least by
1 along each step in the best-response sequence, thus it converges to an NE.
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I Theorem 8. TNGs are potential games.
Proof. Consider a TNG T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉. Recall that for a profile P , the
set of intervals that are used in P is ΥP . We define a potential function Ψ that is an adaptation
of Rosenthal’s potential function [48] to TNGs. We decompose the definition of Ψ into smaller
components, which will be helpful later on. For every γ ∈ ΥP and v ∈ V , we define Ψγ,v(P ) =∑loadP (v,γ)
j=1 |γ| · `v(j), that is, we take the sum of |γ| · `v(j) for all j ∈ [loadP (v, γ)]. We define
Ψγ(P ) =
∑
v∈V Ψγ,v(P ), and we define Ψ(P ) =
∑
γ∈ΥP Ψγ(P ). Let for some i ∈ [k], we
have P ′ to be a profile that is obtained by an unilateral deviation of Player i to a strictly beneficial
strategy pi′i from her current strategy in P , that is P
′ = P [i ← pi′] for some i ∈ [k]. We show that
Ψ(P ) − Ψ(P ′) = costi(P ) − costi(P ′). Let T and T ′ be the minimal sets such that P and P ′ are
T - and T ′-profiles, respectively. Let ΥP,P ′ be a set of intervals that refine the intervals in ΥP and
ΥP ′ according to T ∪ T ′. Formally, consider an interval [a, b] ∈ ΥP . The definition of ΥP implies
that there is no time point t ∈ T with a < t < b. On the other hand, if there exist time points
t1, . . . , tn ∈ T ′ with a < t1 < . . . < tn < b, then [a, t1], [t1, t2], . . . , [tn, b] ∈ ΥP,P ′ , and dually for
intervals in ΥP ′ .
It is not hard to see that since ΥP,P ′ refines ΥP and ΥP ′ , we have
∑
γ∈ΥP,P ′ Ψγ(P ) = Ψ(P )
and
∑
γ∈ΥP,P ′ Ψγ(P
′) = Ψ(P ′). Consider an interval γ ∈ ΥP,P ′ . Recall that P ′ is obtained
by letting Player i change her strategy from the one in P and the other players’ strategies remain
the same. Let v = visitsP (i, γ) and v′ = visitsP ′(i, γ). For every v′′ 6= v, v′, since the other
players do not change their strategies, the loads stay the same over the duration γ and we have
Ψγ,v′′(P ) = Ψγ,v′′(P ′). We consider the case where v 6= v′. Thus, Player i uses v in the interval γ
in P and uses v′ in the same interval in P ′, or the other way around. Thus, we have |loadP (v, γ)−
loadP ′(v, γ)| = 1 and |loadP (v′, γ)− loadP ′(v′, γ)| = 1. Suppose loadP (v, γ) = loadP ′(v, γ) +
1 and loadP (v′, γ) = loadP ′(v′, γ) − 1. Thus Ψγ(P ) − Ψγ(P ′) = (Ψγ,v(P ) + Ψγ,v′(P )) −
(Ψγ,v(P ′)+Ψγ,v′(P ′)) = (Ψγ,v(P )−Ψγ,v(P ′))+(Ψγ,v′(P )−Ψγ,v′(P ′)) = |γ|·`v(loadP (v, γ))−
|γ| · `v′(loadP ′(v′, γ)). Now the costs of Player i in profile P and P ′ over the duration γ are
|γ|·`v(loadP (v, γ)) and |γ|·`v′(loadP ′(v′, γ)) respectively. Thus Ψγ(P )−Ψγ(P ′) = costγ,i(P )−
costγ,i(P ′). Since we sum up for all γ ∈ ΥP,P ′ , we get Ψ(P ) − Ψ(P ′) = costi(P ) − costi(P ′),
and we are done. J
Recall from Theorem 4, that given a TNG, a profile P and an index i, we find the best response
of Player i by constructing a PTA. If P is an integral profile, from Theorem 3, we have that the best
response of Player i also leads to an integer profile. Thus we have the following lemma.
I Lemma 9. Consider a TNG T and an integral profile P . For i ∈ [k], if Player i has a beneficial
deviation from P , then she has an integral beneficial deviation.
The last ingredient of the proof gives a lower bound for the difference in cost that is achieved in
a beneficial integral deviation for some player i ∈ [k], which in turn bounds the change in potential.
We first need to introduce a normalized form of TNGs. Recall that the latency function in a TNG
T is of the form `v : [k]→ Q≥0. In a normalized TNG all the latency functions map loads to natural
numbers, thus for every vertex v ∈ V , we have `v : [k]→ N. Constructing a normalized TNG from
a TNG is easy. Let L be the least common multiple of the denominators of the elements in the set
{`v(l) : v ∈ V and l ∈ [k]}. For every latency function `v and every l ∈ [k] , we construct a new
latency function `′v by `
′
v(l) = `v(l) · L.
Consider a TNG T and let T ′ be the normalized TNG that is constructed from T . It is not hard
to see that for every profile P and i ∈ [k], we have costi(P ) in T ′ is L · costi(P ) in T . We can
thus restrict attention to normalized TNGs as the existence of NE and convergence of best-response
sequence in T ′ implies the same properties in T . In order to show that a best-response sequence
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converges in TNGs, we bound the change of potential in each best-response step by observing that
in normalized TNGs, the cost a player pays is an integer.
I Lemma 10. Let T be a normalized TNG, P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉 be an integral profile in T , and pi′i be
a beneficial integral deviation for Player i, for some i ∈ [k]. Then, costi(P )−costi(P [i← pi′i]) ≥ 1.
We can now prove the main result in this section.
I Theorem 11. Every TNG has an integral NE. Moreover, from an integral profile P , there is a
best-response sequence that converges to an integral NE.
Proof. Lemma 9 allows us to restrict attention to integral deviations. Indeed, consider an integral
profile P . Lemma 9 implies that if no player has a beneficial integral deviation from P , then P is
an NE in T . We start best-response sequence from some integral profile PI and allow the players to
deviate with integral strategies only. Consider a profile P and let P ′ be a profile that is obtained from
P by a deviation of Player i. Recall from Theorem 8 that costi(P )− costi(P ′) = Ψ(P )−Ψ(P ′).
Lemma 10 implies that when the deviation is beneficial, we have Ψ(P ) − Ψ(P ′) ≥ 1. Since the
potential is non-negative, the best-response sequence above converges within Ψ(PI) steps. J
I Remark. A TNG that allows < and > operators on the guards is not guaranteed to have an NE.
Indeed, in a PTA, which can be seen as a one-player TNG, strict guards imply that an optimal timed
path may not be achieved. In turn, this means that an NE does not exist. To overcome this issue, we
use -NE, for  > 0; an -deviation is one that improves the payoff of a player at least by , and an
-NE is a profile in which no player has a -deviation. Our techniques can be adapted to show that
-NE exist in TNGs with strict guards. The proof uses the results of [19] that show that an -optimal
timed path exists in PTAs. The proof technique for existence of NE in TNGs with non-strict guards
can then be adapted to the strict-guard case.
5 Equilibrium Inefficiency
In this section we address the problem of measuring the degradation in social welfare due to selfish
behavior, which is measured by the PoS and PoA measures. We show that the upper bounds from
RAGs on these two measures apply to TNGs. For cost-sharing TNGs, we show that the PoS and
PoA are at most log k and k, respectively, as it is in cost-sharing RAGs. Matching lower bounds
were given in [14] already for GTNGs. For congestion TNGs with affine latency functions, we show
that the PoS and PoA are 1 +
√
(3)/3 ≈ 1.577 and 52 , respectively, as it is in congestion RAGs.
Again, a matching lower bound for PoA is shown in [14] for GTNGs, and a matching lower bound
for the PoS remains open. Let F denote a family of latency functions and F-TNGs and F-RAGs
denote, respectively, the family of TNGs and RAGs that use latency functions from this family.
I Theorem 12. Consider a family of latency functionsF . We havePoS(F-TNGs) ≤ PoS(F-RAGs)
and PoA(F-TNGs) ≤ PoA(F-RAGs). In particular, the PoS and PoA for cost-sharing TNGs with
k players is at most log(k) and k, respectively, and for congestion TNGs with affine latency functions
it is at most roughly 1.577 and 52 respectively.
Proof. We prove for PoS in cost-sharing games and the other proofs are similar. Consider a TNG T
and let N1, N2, . . . be a sequence of NEs whose cost tends to c∗ = infP∈Γ(T ) cost(P ). Let O be a
social optimum profile in T , which exists due to Theorem 6. Thus, PoS(T ) = limj→∞ cost(N j)/
cost(O). We show that each element in the sequence is bounded above by PoS(cost-sharing RAGs),
which implies that PoS(T ) ≤ PoS(cost-sharing RAGs), and hence PoS(cost-sharing TNGs) ≤
PoS(cost-sharing RAGs). For each j ≥ 1, we construct below an RAG Rj that has PoS(Rj) =
cost(N j)/cost(O), and sinceRj is a cost-sharing RAG, we havePoS(Rj) ≤ PoS(cost- sharing RAGs).
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For j ≥ 1, we construct a RAG Rj in which, for each i ∈ [k], Player i has two strategies; one
corresponding to her strategy in N j and one corresponding to her strategy in O. Formally, let Υj =
ΥNj∪ΥO be the time periods ofN j andO. We construct a RAGRj = 〈k,Ej , {Σji}i∈[k], {`e}e∈Ej 〉,
where Ej = V × Υj and for each e = 〈v, γ〉 ∈ Ej , we define `e such that for each l ∈ [k], we
have that `e(l) = |γ| · `v(l). and we define the players’ strategies below. Recall that, for a profile
P , i ∈ [k], and an interval γ, visitsP (i, γ) denotes the vertex at which Player i stays during γ in
P . We extend the definition of visitsP to allow periods that occur after Player i has reached her
destination, and define that the function returns ui. Moreover, we assume w.l.o.g. that ui is a ver-
tex with no outgoing edges, thus the paths of the other players do not traverse ui. Player i’s two
strategies are nji = {visitsNj (i, γ) : γ ∈ ΥNj} and oji = {visitsO(i, γ) : γ ∈ ΥO}. Clearly,
〈oj1, . . . , ojk〉 is the social optimum of Rj . Also, 〈nj1, . . . , njk〉 is an NE and we assume it is the
cheapest NE in Rj . Otherwise, we can alter N j to match the best NE in Rj and only improve the
sequence. Thus, we have PoS(Rj) = cost(N j)/cost(O). Since Rj is a cost-sharing RAG, we
have PoS(Rj) ≤ PoS(cost-sharing RAGs), and we are done. J
6 Time Bounds
Recall that due to resets of clocks, the time by which a profile ends can be potentially unbounded.
It is interesting to know, given a TNG, whether there are time bounds within which some inter-
esting profiles like an NE and an SO are guaranteed to exist. Earlier we showed that every TNG
is guaranteed to have an integral NE (Theorem 11) and an integral SO (Theorem 6). In this sec-
tion we give bounds on the time by which such profiles end. That is, given a TNG T , we find
tNE(T ), TSO(T ) ∈ Q≥0 such that an integral NE N and an integral SO O exist in T in which the
players reach their destinations by time tNE(T ) and TSO(T ) respectively.
We start by showing a time bound on an optimal timed path in a PTA, and then proceed to TNGs.
I Lemma 13. Consider a PTA P = 〈C, V,E, {rv}v∈V 〉, and let χ be the largest constant appear-
ing in the guards on the edges of P . Then, for every s, u ∈ V , there is an integral optimal timed path
from s to u that ends by time |V | · (χ+ 2)|C|.
Proof. Consider an optimal integral timed path η in P that ends in the earliest time and includes
no loop that is traversed instantaneously. Let v0, . . . , vn be the sequence of vertices that η traverses,
and, for 0 ≤ i < n, let κi be the clock valuation before exiting the vertex vi. Since η is integral,
κi assigns integral values to clocks. Note that since the largest constant appearing in a guard in P
is χ, the guards in P cannot differentiate between clock values greater than χ. We abstract away
such values and define the restriction of a clock valuation κi to be βi : C → ({0} ∪ [χ] ∪ {>}) by
setting, for x ∈ C, the value βi(x) = κi(x), when κi(x) ≤ χ, and βi(x) = >, when κi(x) > χ.
Assume towards contradiction that η ends after time |V | · (χ+ 2)|C|. Then, there are 0 ≤ i < j < n
such that 〈vi, βi〉 = 〈vj , βj〉. Let η = η1 · η2 · η3 be a partition of η such that η2 is the sub-path
between the i-th and j-th indices. Consider the path η′ = η′1 ·η′3 that is obtained from η by removing
the sub-path η2. First, note that η′ is a legal path. Indeed, the restrictions of the clock valuations in
η1 and η3 match these in η′1 and η
′
3, that is, η
′ = η1 · η3. Second, since we assume that traversing
the loop η2 is not instantaneous, we know that η′ ends before η. Moreover, since the rates in P are
non-negative, we have price(η′) ≤ price(η), and we reach a contradiction to the fact that η is an
optimal timed path that ends earliest. J
I Theorem 14. For a k-player TNG T with a set V of vertices and a set C of clocks, there exists
an SO that ends by time O(|V |k · χk|C|), where χ is the maximum constant appearing in T . For
every k ≥ 1, there is a k-player (cost-sharing and congestion) TNG Tk such that Tk hasO(k) states,
the boundaries in the guards in Tk are bounded byO(k log k), and any SO in Tk requires time 2Ω(k).
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Proof. We start with the upper bound. Consider a TNG T with a set V of vertices and a set C of
clocks. By Theorem 6, we can construct a PTA P with |V |k vertices and k|C| clocks such that a
social optimum of T is an optimal timed path in P . Applying Lemma 13, we are done.
We turn to the lower bounds. We show that for every k ≥ 1, there is a k-player (cost-sharing and
congestion) TNG Tk such that Tk has O(k) states, the boundaries in the guards in Tk are bounded
by O(k log k), and any SO in Tk requires time 2Ω(k).
1
...
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v u
x = p1, {x}
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x = 1
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x=p1, {x}
x=p2, {x}
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Figure 4 The time required for the SO is not polynomial.
Consider the k-player cost-sharing TNG appearing on the left of Figure 4. Let p1, . . . , pk be
relatively prime (e.g., the the first k prime numbers). All the vertices in the TNG have cost 0, except
for v, which has some positive cost function. Each player i has to spend one time unit in v in her
path from si to u. In an SO, all k players spend this one time unit simultaneously, which forces them
all to reach v at time
∏
1≤i≤k pi. Since the i-th prime number is O(i log i) and the product of the
first i prime numbers is 2Ω(i), we are done. We note that we could define the TNG also with no free
vertices, that is vertics with 0 cost, by setting the cost in v to be much higher than those in the source
vertices.
For congestion games, the example is more complicated. We start with the case of two players.
Consider the congestion TNG appearing on the right of Figure 4. Assume that p1 and p2 are relatively
prime, rs1(1) = rs2(1) = 0, and rs1(2) = rs2(2) = 1. In the SO, the two players avoid each other
in their paths from si to ui, and the way to do so is to wait p1 · p2 time units before the edge from
si to s3−i is traversed. Below we generalize this example to k players. Again, we could define the
TNG with no free vertices.
We generalize the 2-player congestion TNG appearing on the right of Figure 4 to an arbitrary
number of players. The extension to 3 players appears in Figure 5 below. As in the case of 2 players,
the cost function in the vertices s1, s2, and s3 is 0 for load 1 and strictly positive for higher loads. In
order to reach her target, Player i has to traverse 2 edges in the triangle before she can take the edge
to ui. In the SO that ends at the earliest possible time, the players perform these traversals together,
so the game needs time 2 · p1 · p2 · p3.
s1
s3
u1
s2
u3
u2
x =
p1 , {x}
x
=
p
2,
{x
}
x =
p3,
{x}
x = 1
x = 1
x
=
1
x = p1, {x}
x = p3, {x}
x = p2, {x}
Figure 5 The time required for the SO is 2 · p1 · p2 · p3.
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In the extension to k players, the TNG consists of a k-vertex polygon (to which the target vertices
are connected), and the players have to traverse k−1 edges in it. Doing this simultaneously requires
time (k − 1) · p1 · p2 · · · pk. J
We proceed to derive a time bound for the existence of an NE. For a TNG T , let LT ∈ N be
the smallest number such that multiplying the latency functions by LT results in a normalized TNG.
Recall the SO(T ) is the cost of a social optimum in T .
I Theorem 15. Consider a TNG T with k players, played on a timed network 〈V,E,C〉, and
let χ be the maximum constant appearing in a guard. Then, there is an NE in T that ends by
time O(ϕ · |V | · χ|C| + |V |k · χk|C|), where ϕ = LT · SO(T ) for congestion TNGs and ϕ =
LT · log(k) · SO(T ) for cost-sharing TNGs.
Proof. Recall the proof of Theorem 11 that shows that every TNG has an integral NE: we choose
an initial integral profile P and perform integral best-response moves until an NE is reached. The
number of iterations is bounded by the potential Ψ(P ) of P . We start the best-response sequence
from a social-optimum profile O that ends earliest. By Theorem 14, there is such a profile that
ends by time O(|V |k · χk|C|). Let ϕ = LT · SO(T ) in the case of congestion TNGs and ϕ =
LT · (ln(k) + 1) · SO(T ) in the case of cost-sharing TNGs. It is not hard to show that Ψ(O) ≤ ϕ.
Next, we bound the time that is added in a best-response step. We recall the construction in
Theorem 4 of the PTA P for finding a best-response move. Consider a TNG T and a profile of
strategies P , where, w.l.o.g., we look for a best-response for Player k. Suppose the strategies of
Players 1, . . . , k − 1 take transitions at times τ1, . . . , τn. We construct a PTA P with n + 1 copies
of T . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, an optimal path in P starts in the first copy and moves from copy i to
copy (i + 1) at time τi. We use the additional “global” clock to enforce these transitions. A key
observation is that in the last copy, this additional clock is never used. Thus, the largest constant in a
guard in the last copy coincides with χ, the largest constant appearing in T . Let η be an optimal path
in P and pik the corresponding strategy for Player k. We distinguish between two cases. If η does
not enter the last copy of P , then it ends before time τn, namely the latest time at which a player
reaches her destination. Then, the profile P [k ← pik] ends no later than P . In the second case, the
path η ends in the last copy of P . We view the last copy of P as a PTA. By Lemma 13, the time at
which η ends is within |V | · (χ+2)|C| since its entrance into the copy, which is τn. Then, P [i← pik]
ends at most |V | · (χ+ 2)|C| time units after P . To conclude, the best-response sequence terminates
in an NE that ends by time O(ϕ · |V | · (χ+ 2)|C| + |V |k · χk|C|). J
7 Discussion and Future Work
The model of TNGs studied in this paper extends the model of GTNGs introduced in [14] by adding
clocks. From a practical point of view, the addition of clocks makes TNGs significantly more ex-
pressive than GTNGs and enables them to model the behavior of many systems that cannot be
modeled using GTNGs. From a theoretical point of view, the analysis of TNGs poses different and
difficult technical challenges. In the case of GTNGs, a main tool for obtaining positive results is a
reduction between GTNGs and NGs. Here, in order to obtain positive results we need to combine
techniques from NGs and PTAs.
We left several open problems. In Theorem 11, we describe a method for finding an integral NE
through a sequence of BR moves. We leave open the complexity of finding an NE in TNGs. For the
upper bound, we conjecture that there is a PSPACE algorithm for the problem. For the lower bound,
we would need to find an appropriate complexity class of search problems and show hardness for
that class. For example, PLS [31], which lies “close” to P, and includes the problem of finding an NE
in NGs, consists of search problems in which a local search, e.g., a BR sequence, terminates. Unlike
NGs, where a BR can be found in polynomial time, in TNGs, the problem is PSPACE-complete. To
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the best of our knowledge, complexity classes for search problems that are higher than PLS were
not studied. Further we show that the BR and SO problems for one-clock TNGs is in PSPACE and
is NP-hard, leaving open the tight complexity.
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas of formal
verification and algorithmic game theory: logics for specifying multi-agent systems [9, 26], studies
of equilibria in games related to synthesis and repair problems [25, 24, 33, 4], and of non-zero-sum
games in formal verification [28, 22]. This line of work also includes efficient reasoning about NGs
with huge networks [40, 13], an extension of NGs to objectives that are richer than reachability
[16], and NGs in which the players select their paths dynamically [15]. For future work, we plan
to apply the real-time behavior of TNGs to these last two concepts; namely, TNGs in which the
players’ objectives are given as a specification that is more general than simple reachability or TNGs
in which the players reveal their choice of timed path in steps, bringing TNGs closer to the timed
games of [12, 3].
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